My time here in 1886 is coming to an end at last. After all the snags and distractions, we are going home. My roommate has finally stumbled upon a way to open a stable vortex with our newly reconstructed time machine, and we are going home. The one thing I won’t miss is having to work while I’ve been in this place, especially after wading through filth as a trash collector. It’s one of those reality checks about the 19th century that I was aware of but not prepared for. In the last few days since I’ve been waiting to get home, I’ve been thinking about the legacies of the Haymarket incident…
There have been many legacies that have developed in the one hundred-twenty years since the Haymarket riot. To this time-traveler, two of the biggest legacies of the Haymarket incident have got to be the “Red Scare” that gripped the nation, as well as the miscarriage of justice that came as a result of the ensuing hysteria. Immediately after the riot occurred, a wave of fear-tinged speculation held large sections of the US population enthralled for the months following the incident. “The fear of an anarchist conspiracy gripped not only capitalists and the authorities but public opinion in general. For a large segment of the population the anarchists ceased to be human beings. (Avrich, 177)” Most of this hysteria was reinforced by newspaper articles that focused on anarchism’s advocacy of self-defense, as well as the foreignness of their ideas, which in turn fed the public desire to see justice done. The stereotyping of anarchists as murderous, bearded terrorists in turn led to a climate of anti-German feeling, as Germans were partially responsible for the spread of radical ideology. This climate of fear also allowed a police dragnet to comb through Chicago without any warrants, arresting any anarchist or radical with connections to the local labor movement. This anti-red witch hunt was coordinated by Inspector Bonfield, who had ordered the police to move on the rally that preceded the so-called riot, and his superior, Captain Schaak, who saw the Haymarket as a chance to clean up Chicago and make an example of the movement’s leaders. Besides warrantless searches and arrests, Schaak and Bonfield openly tried to create witness testimony, along with shutting down any radical papers connected to the anarchists. Anarchists on the other hand, used the same dehumanizing tactics against those perceived to be their enemies. Police, for example, were referred to as “bloodhounds” just as the moniker “pig” developed during the Vietnam era protest culture (Avrich, 215-35). Essentially, both sides became embroiled in their own hatred and propaganda, perhaps making the entire Haymarket incident inevitable. In other words, something was going to happen, but no one knew when. To be sure, anarchists wanted to start a revolution, but they were righting for a ripe moment that could be used as propaganda. In this way, the riot furnished an example, but it was not the right one, as those on the chopping block allegedly were the best and brightest of the Chicago movement. The riot was overblown, and details aside, both parties must share equal parts of the blame for its occurrence. It is just that the wrong people were blamed for the actual crime. “Both sides were prisoners of conspiracy theories… Bonfield, to be sure, defended business interests and had resolved to rid the city of radicals. But it is doubtful that he had any well-conceived plan at the Haymarket. He saw his chance and took it. The same perhaps was true for the bomb-thrower. (Avrich, 214)”
Given the public outcry for blood, the resulting guilty verdict of the Haymarket Eight could be seen as inevitable. “The conviction of men for murder who had not even been present when the bomb was thrown, the packed jury, the perjured testimony, the twisted interpretation of the law by a judge plainly determined to hang the defendants, the open avowal of the prosecution that the men were being tried for their opinions rather than deeds… as time passed… a growing number of observers, most of whom abhorred anarchism and had no sympathy with radical propaganda of any sort, concluded that the condemned men had not received impartial justice. (Avrich, 300-1)” In this way, the trial itself was the high-water mark of the 1886 Red Scare. Another facet of the public scare was its effect on the labor movement itself, prompting union leaders and agitators to tone down their activities in the face of a backlash from the business classes who, like the police, took their opportunity to try and silence the outcry of the unions and organizers. To this end, “law and order leagues” were created to upset any further union activity, and for a time, it had appeared as if Chicago’s capitalist classes had defeated the radical factions almost completely and the end of an era had come. In a way, this view was true, as anarchism as an ideology essentially ended in this time, allowing more moderate union leaders to take the forefront in the struggle for better conditions (Avrich, 428-30). After the remaining anarchists were hung in November of 1887, public opinion turned to other things, and Chicago gradually settled into the status quo, with labor activists and business interests clashing over conditions. As time went on, the public forgot how angry they had been, which allowed an opportunity for the miscarriage of justice to be fixed after a fashion. In 1893, while Chicagoans were occupied by the Columbian Exposition, Governor John Altgeldt, who had a reputation for liberalism and being on fair terms with the labor factions, issued a pardon for the final three anarchists in jail, effectively bringing the incident to a close. Altgeldt’s reasoning for his actions was that the trial was a sham across the board, and that justice was not meted out according to constitutional protocol, blaming Judge Gary and Prosecutor Grinnell on this count, as well as the Chicago Tribune for tampering with the jury pool. It was not a popular decision, but over time, it came to be seen as an act political courage in later years (Avrich, 417-26).
In the 21st Century, Haymarket’s effects still linger in our society, namely in terms of an out of control media that arbitrarily creates “others” for the mainstream population to oppose, which could lead some to believe that this tendency developed during the Haymarket period. In times of fear and uncertainty, people turn to the media for assurance and information, and as technology changes our ability to access media sources, but the media’s aims have not changed. Basically, if the media magnates can keep our attention with fear-mongering (and the occasional scandal), then they can continue to generate profit at the public’s expense. This fear-mongering phenomenon in turn has repeatedly been used to relax the humanitarian impulse of the public, allowing witch hunts to periodically set Americans against one another. Meddling by the media also contributes to the continuing miscarriages of justice in this country, with the full publication of criminal case details, which inevitably tampers with any potential jury pool. The development of the media as an invisible branch of government that shapes American opinion has got to be Haymarket’s most salient legacy. Even today, Americans can still be easily distracted by scary stories that do not really provide any useful information, but instead feed a blood-lust that allows enough leeway for government authorities to act more freely in their own objectives. The search for bin Laden, and wider scare campaign surrounding the “war on terror” strikes me as a good example of this media-government partnership. In 1886, articles about the search for the mysterious bomber kept the public’s mind on a continuing and imminent threat. It was good that the bomber was never caught because then a sense of finality could be had, and the public would not be as docile. The hunt for bin Laden is similar in this way; as long as there is a popular enemy on the loose, than the rationale for crushing their ideology and its support still tacitly exists. It does not matter if bin Laden is ever captured, or if he is still even alive, as long as he is a symbol, the media can use his image and name to incite and/or reaffirm fear in the public.
And on that happy note, I’m leaving this place and not thinking about it ever again. I had some close calls, and I was tempted to change history… maybe beat the media at its own game somehow, but I’m not sure I could have done any good. In the end, I’m just glad that the media was so focused on this event that no one of consequence noticed the piece of the 21st Century that was dropped onto the outskirts of 19th Century Chicago.
Bibliography
Avrich, Paul. The Haymarket Tragedy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Part 2: The View From My Time
Hello again readers... There hasn't been much going on here in the past lately. Talk about the riot last May has died down a bit. Most Chicagoans who are thinking about it are talking about the details of the trial, the lengthy appeals process, or whether the condemned should have their reprieve. Beyond that exists the fear and doubt left behind from the initial media frenzy as to any further anarchist threats, as well as answers as to who the "real bomber" was on this last May 4th...
Anarchism initially developed in Europe during the revolutions and uprisings of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as well as during the political disputes of Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin in the 1860s for control of the International Workingmen’s Association. Bakunin’s anarchism departed from Marxist thought on the point of uprisings. Where Marx argued for a measured process of stages leading to revolution, Bakunin argued that through willful acts of defiance, the masses could be made aware of their power and the resulting revolution could help create a better world. These actions advocated by Bakunin and other anarchists were not important on their own. Instead, through the reproduction of material from anarchist trials, the anarchist message was able to be spread to larger audiences than more conventional writings or lectures, thereby amplifying their general message (Elun, 34-6). The growth of anarchism in America has been tainted by stereotyped notions of what anarchists are and what they represent. These stereotypes were largely formed during the Haymarket era, drawing on the foreignness of ideas brought to America by radical Germans. Anarchism in America however, has mainly been a domestic affair and a good deal of its adherents were converted in the crucible of the American labor struggles. Albert Parsons demonstrates this reality both with his native birth and his arrival at anarchism being the solution to America’s labor struggle. Parsons was the progeny of Puritan founders and Revolutionary War partisans. He fought as a Confederate volunteer, and then fought for the rights of ex-slaves after the war. These events led Parsons to become a fighter and an organizer during labor strikes in the North, and it was his experience during the brutal and divisive Great Strike of 1877 that led to Parsons becoming an anarchist (Avrich, 3-38).
Parson’s conversion began with his joining the Socialistic Labor Party in Chicago, which had become a center point in labor struggles and ideology. During this time, Parsons worked within the system, agitating for the eight hour work day and other labor reforms. His slide into anarchism mirrored the split of the SLP, which is to say the dispute over the use of self-defense and direct action to attain Party goals. Disputes over whether to support groups such as the Lehr und Verein, which were essentially worker’s militias that patrolled ethnic neighborhoods and made other public displays, contributing to the sense of fear in Chicago of labor radicals. Tension within the SLP over whether to support these groups led to the split of the party, with men like Parsons and Spies becoming anarchists, dedicated to the violent restructuring of American society (Avrich, 39-52). Auguste Spies’ journey to anarchism was much the same as Parsons in that he came to America, became a Socialist, was confronted by the reality of the labor struggle in America, and became an anarchist in response. In a sense, American anarchists built a homegrown philosophy of fighting fire with fire. “Of all the major movements of social reform, anarchism has been the subject to the grossest distortions of its nature and objectives,” and their leaders were subjected to stereotypes that many Americans may still be familiar with. This classic image of the anarchist was “bewhiskered, foreign-looking… with a bomb in one hand and a dagger or pistol in the other, conspiring against rulers and capitalists (Avrich, 61).” In reality, anarchists were like any other reform organization in the 19th Century. They organized charities and parades, published newspapers, and held labor rallies at local beer-halls. However, the militaristic tone of their rhetoric caused an atmosphere of fear in Chicago, especially among the upper classes and the police in the first half of the 1880s (Avrich, 136-149).
Who was the bomber? This sentiment, voiced in a myriad of ways, has dominated local conversations in Chicago as much as talk about the anarchists’ appeal or the growing police funds. In the public mind, there have been many suspects, most of whom are quite viable. The police have settled on an anarchist connected to the trial, or another member of the conspiracy who managed to escape. The papers have indicted any foreigner whom a claim is made about, which of course allows the Times to harp away at “rabid anarchists” and their inhuman beliefs. The anarchists want to believe that one of their own did it, but no one will claim responsibility, which considering the nature of anarchist beliefs, seems to be counterproductive to the method of deliberate martyrdom. This idea is strengthened by the fact that Chicago anarchists had agreed that the May 4th rally was to be a peaceful assembly. Other anarchists (and some others) have suggested very convincingly that the bomber was in fact an agent provocateur or even a Pinkerton agent in service of the capitalists. In fact this position was advanced by Parsons until the day he died at the gallows. Other suspects include a worker with a personal axe to grind, a deranged individual, or a lone bomber who wanted to cause mayhem and left shortly after. It seems quite likely that one of these last three is the probable bomber, and they simply used the Haymarket rally as the staging ground for their madness and/or anger.
The trial of the Haymarket Eight was Chicago’s “trial of the century” in terms of visibility and notoriety. The most salient feature of the proceedings, which lasted June 21 to August 20, was the almost complete lack of evidence from State Prosecutor Grinnell, who relied more on inflammatory remarks designed to create bias among the jury. Grinnell focused on their militant ideology that called for the destruction of the state while offering up witnesses that seemed to have “seen everything” that led to the bombing. One of these witnesses, one Harry Gilmer, spun a tale that he had stood next to the bombers on Desplaines street, but could not get a clear look at him. Supposedly, he had also seen the speakers at the rally, namely Fielden and Spies, firing into the police formation and shouting encouragement to the others in the crowd to fight back. However, the funny thing about this is that I also was standing near the bombers, and not only did any of them not look like any of the defendants, I never saw any of the speakers advocating violence, let alone firing into the police. In fact, the police fired their weapons almost exclusively into a dwindling crowd of people at the end of a lukewarm rally. But then, other witnesses included Pinkerton agents who had infiltrated labor organizations and agitated within for violent action against the police, so of course the bombing must have been carried out by the anarchists. This kind of evidence was all the state had against the Haymarket Eight, and their attorney, Captain Black, tried his very best to defend his charges, but he had a major roadblock in the form of Judge Gary. Gary made it his personal mission to obstruct the defense’s case by constantly ruling in favor of the prosecution and weighing in against the men with anti-anarchist diatribes along with a basic disinterest in the trial. At one point, he had spent the entire proceeding surrounded by young socialites who spent the day sneering at the defendants while the judge doodled at his bench! Gary’s biggest oversight was his lax juror selection process. In short, he never honored a defense challenge, and allowed the box to be crowded with men who had been exposed to about two months of bad press, practically guaranteeing a guilty verdict (Avrich, 260-277).
On August 20, the Haymarket Eight were sentenced to death by hanging on December 3, 1886, and attempts to appeal the verdicts of the Haymarket Eight began almost after the trial’s conclusion. Supporters of clemency for the anarchists had a fairly wide base of support, ranging from socialists around the world to more politically modern Chicagoans who thought the anarchists did not get a fair shake by the justice system. Other supporters of clemency sought to stem the creation of future radicals by allowing the Haymarket Eight to become martyrs. This fight lasted for over a year until on September 14, 1887, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, sentencing the anarchists to death on November 11, 1887 (Avrich, 297-312). The issue of clemency then became the sole remaining option available to save the lives of the anarchists, and all efforts were concentrated on lobbying the office of Governor Oglesby. For the Governor to do this however, state law required that the defendants personally appeal for clemency. With this in mind, Oglesby drafted an agreement that would have granted clemency if the Haymarket Eight would only repudiate their past statements advocating extremism and the violent overthrow of the federal system. This produced mixed results. Three of the anarchists, Fielden, Schwab, and Neebe disavowed their earlier political statements and gained their reprieves by November 10, 1887. The other five (Lingg, Spies, Engels, Fischer, and Parsons) remained obstinate however, with Parsons representing the dissent, which was essentially that either the anarchists were innocent or guilty, but they would not back down from their political beliefs. These men were then committed to facing their deaths on the 11th. Lingg managed to martyr himself by igniting a smuggled piece of dynamite in mouth on the evening of the 10th. The other four died the next day by strangulation before a crowd of nervous onlookers (Avrich, 355-62).
An interesting aside occurs to me worth mentioning at this point with regard to the clemency issue. That is, the events of the Haymarket helped to create a rift in the Knights of Labor workers’ organization. The Knights had built their reputation on a legacy of cooperation and non-politicized action, but during the heady period known as the Great Struggle, there existed a passive competition between the Knights and the various anarchist organizations for the hearts and minds of laborers. When the topic of clemency for the anarchists emerged, the Knights set aside their disdain for anarchists and began collecting signatures for the defendants’ appeal, but these initiatives were disrupted by Terence Powderly, whose disdain could not be set aside. This overtly political act, driven both by ideological disdain and a desire to avoid the media’s branding irons, contributed to divisions in the organization, which left it open to outside pushes from the capitalist factions. (Weir, 421-39)
Stay tuned readers for the final installments of my long trip through 1886 and the ordeal of the Haymarket Eight. Next time, we shall look at the aftermath of the whole event in terms of 19th century America and the labor struggle, especially with regard to the nation’s first “red scare.” We shall also look at the modern implications of this tragic event and what it could mean in connection to the emerging 21st century…
Bibliography
Avrich, Paul. The Haymarket Tragedy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Elun, Gabriel. Performing Persecution: Witnessing and Martyrdom in the Anarchist Tradition. Radical History Review, Issue 98 (Spring 2007). MARHO: The Red Historians Organization, Inc., pgs 334-56.
Weir, Robert. A Fragile Alliance: Henry George and the Knights of Labor. American Journal of Economies and Sociology, v.56, no.4, Special Issue: Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Death of Henry George (October 1997), pgs 421-39.
Anarchism initially developed in Europe during the revolutions and uprisings of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as well as during the political disputes of Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin in the 1860s for control of the International Workingmen’s Association. Bakunin’s anarchism departed from Marxist thought on the point of uprisings. Where Marx argued for a measured process of stages leading to revolution, Bakunin argued that through willful acts of defiance, the masses could be made aware of their power and the resulting revolution could help create a better world. These actions advocated by Bakunin and other anarchists were not important on their own. Instead, through the reproduction of material from anarchist trials, the anarchist message was able to be spread to larger audiences than more conventional writings or lectures, thereby amplifying their general message (Elun, 34-6). The growth of anarchism in America has been tainted by stereotyped notions of what anarchists are and what they represent. These stereotypes were largely formed during the Haymarket era, drawing on the foreignness of ideas brought to America by radical Germans. Anarchism in America however, has mainly been a domestic affair and a good deal of its adherents were converted in the crucible of the American labor struggles. Albert Parsons demonstrates this reality both with his native birth and his arrival at anarchism being the solution to America’s labor struggle. Parsons was the progeny of Puritan founders and Revolutionary War partisans. He fought as a Confederate volunteer, and then fought for the rights of ex-slaves after the war. These events led Parsons to become a fighter and an organizer during labor strikes in the North, and it was his experience during the brutal and divisive Great Strike of 1877 that led to Parsons becoming an anarchist (Avrich, 3-38).
Parson’s conversion began with his joining the Socialistic Labor Party in Chicago, which had become a center point in labor struggles and ideology. During this time, Parsons worked within the system, agitating for the eight hour work day and other labor reforms. His slide into anarchism mirrored the split of the SLP, which is to say the dispute over the use of self-defense and direct action to attain Party goals. Disputes over whether to support groups such as the Lehr und Verein, which were essentially worker’s militias that patrolled ethnic neighborhoods and made other public displays, contributing to the sense of fear in Chicago of labor radicals. Tension within the SLP over whether to support these groups led to the split of the party, with men like Parsons and Spies becoming anarchists, dedicated to the violent restructuring of American society (Avrich, 39-52). Auguste Spies’ journey to anarchism was much the same as Parsons in that he came to America, became a Socialist, was confronted by the reality of the labor struggle in America, and became an anarchist in response. In a sense, American anarchists built a homegrown philosophy of fighting fire with fire. “Of all the major movements of social reform, anarchism has been the subject to the grossest distortions of its nature and objectives,” and their leaders were subjected to stereotypes that many Americans may still be familiar with. This classic image of the anarchist was “bewhiskered, foreign-looking… with a bomb in one hand and a dagger or pistol in the other, conspiring against rulers and capitalists (Avrich, 61).” In reality, anarchists were like any other reform organization in the 19th Century. They organized charities and parades, published newspapers, and held labor rallies at local beer-halls. However, the militaristic tone of their rhetoric caused an atmosphere of fear in Chicago, especially among the upper classes and the police in the first half of the 1880s (Avrich, 136-149).
Who was the bomber? This sentiment, voiced in a myriad of ways, has dominated local conversations in Chicago as much as talk about the anarchists’ appeal or the growing police funds. In the public mind, there have been many suspects, most of whom are quite viable. The police have settled on an anarchist connected to the trial, or another member of the conspiracy who managed to escape. The papers have indicted any foreigner whom a claim is made about, which of course allows the Times to harp away at “rabid anarchists” and their inhuman beliefs. The anarchists want to believe that one of their own did it, but no one will claim responsibility, which considering the nature of anarchist beliefs, seems to be counterproductive to the method of deliberate martyrdom. This idea is strengthened by the fact that Chicago anarchists had agreed that the May 4th rally was to be a peaceful assembly. Other anarchists (and some others) have suggested very convincingly that the bomber was in fact an agent provocateur or even a Pinkerton agent in service of the capitalists. In fact this position was advanced by Parsons until the day he died at the gallows. Other suspects include a worker with a personal axe to grind, a deranged individual, or a lone bomber who wanted to cause mayhem and left shortly after. It seems quite likely that one of these last three is the probable bomber, and they simply used the Haymarket rally as the staging ground for their madness and/or anger.
The trial of the Haymarket Eight was Chicago’s “trial of the century” in terms of visibility and notoriety. The most salient feature of the proceedings, which lasted June 21 to August 20, was the almost complete lack of evidence from State Prosecutor Grinnell, who relied more on inflammatory remarks designed to create bias among the jury. Grinnell focused on their militant ideology that called for the destruction of the state while offering up witnesses that seemed to have “seen everything” that led to the bombing. One of these witnesses, one Harry Gilmer, spun a tale that he had stood next to the bombers on Desplaines street, but could not get a clear look at him. Supposedly, he had also seen the speakers at the rally, namely Fielden and Spies, firing into the police formation and shouting encouragement to the others in the crowd to fight back. However, the funny thing about this is that I also was standing near the bombers, and not only did any of them not look like any of the defendants, I never saw any of the speakers advocating violence, let alone firing into the police. In fact, the police fired their weapons almost exclusively into a dwindling crowd of people at the end of a lukewarm rally. But then, other witnesses included Pinkerton agents who had infiltrated labor organizations and agitated within for violent action against the police, so of course the bombing must have been carried out by the anarchists. This kind of evidence was all the state had against the Haymarket Eight, and their attorney, Captain Black, tried his very best to defend his charges, but he had a major roadblock in the form of Judge Gary. Gary made it his personal mission to obstruct the defense’s case by constantly ruling in favor of the prosecution and weighing in against the men with anti-anarchist diatribes along with a basic disinterest in the trial. At one point, he had spent the entire proceeding surrounded by young socialites who spent the day sneering at the defendants while the judge doodled at his bench! Gary’s biggest oversight was his lax juror selection process. In short, he never honored a defense challenge, and allowed the box to be crowded with men who had been exposed to about two months of bad press, practically guaranteeing a guilty verdict (Avrich, 260-277).
On August 20, the Haymarket Eight were sentenced to death by hanging on December 3, 1886, and attempts to appeal the verdicts of the Haymarket Eight began almost after the trial’s conclusion. Supporters of clemency for the anarchists had a fairly wide base of support, ranging from socialists around the world to more politically modern Chicagoans who thought the anarchists did not get a fair shake by the justice system. Other supporters of clemency sought to stem the creation of future radicals by allowing the Haymarket Eight to become martyrs. This fight lasted for over a year until on September 14, 1887, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, sentencing the anarchists to death on November 11, 1887 (Avrich, 297-312). The issue of clemency then became the sole remaining option available to save the lives of the anarchists, and all efforts were concentrated on lobbying the office of Governor Oglesby. For the Governor to do this however, state law required that the defendants personally appeal for clemency. With this in mind, Oglesby drafted an agreement that would have granted clemency if the Haymarket Eight would only repudiate their past statements advocating extremism and the violent overthrow of the federal system. This produced mixed results. Three of the anarchists, Fielden, Schwab, and Neebe disavowed their earlier political statements and gained their reprieves by November 10, 1887. The other five (Lingg, Spies, Engels, Fischer, and Parsons) remained obstinate however, with Parsons representing the dissent, which was essentially that either the anarchists were innocent or guilty, but they would not back down from their political beliefs. These men were then committed to facing their deaths on the 11th. Lingg managed to martyr himself by igniting a smuggled piece of dynamite in mouth on the evening of the 10th. The other four died the next day by strangulation before a crowd of nervous onlookers (Avrich, 355-62).
An interesting aside occurs to me worth mentioning at this point with regard to the clemency issue. That is, the events of the Haymarket helped to create a rift in the Knights of Labor workers’ organization. The Knights had built their reputation on a legacy of cooperation and non-politicized action, but during the heady period known as the Great Struggle, there existed a passive competition between the Knights and the various anarchist organizations for the hearts and minds of laborers. When the topic of clemency for the anarchists emerged, the Knights set aside their disdain for anarchists and began collecting signatures for the defendants’ appeal, but these initiatives were disrupted by Terence Powderly, whose disdain could not be set aside. This overtly political act, driven both by ideological disdain and a desire to avoid the media’s branding irons, contributed to divisions in the organization, which left it open to outside pushes from the capitalist factions. (Weir, 421-39)
Stay tuned readers for the final installments of my long trip through 1886 and the ordeal of the Haymarket Eight. Next time, we shall look at the aftermath of the whole event in terms of 19th century America and the labor struggle, especially with regard to the nation’s first “red scare.” We shall also look at the modern implications of this tragic event and what it could mean in connection to the emerging 21st century…
Bibliography
Avrich, Paul. The Haymarket Tragedy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Elun, Gabriel. Performing Persecution: Witnessing and Martyrdom in the Anarchist Tradition. Radical History Review, Issue 98 (Spring 2007). MARHO: The Red Historians Organization, Inc., pgs 334-56.
Weir, Robert. A Fragile Alliance: Henry George and the Knights of Labor. American Journal of Economies and Sociology, v.56, no.4, Special Issue: Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Death of Henry George (October 1997), pgs 421-39.
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